As detractors of the British ID card and National Identity Register have correctly identified, there is no proven correlation between the existence of ID cards and benefits in combating terrorism.
Terrorism, in this case, can be defined as the deliberate use of violence, or the deliberate threat of extreme violence, against civilians in order to achieve stated political goals. So by this measure terrorism becomes a definable and illegal tactic that private citizens, organised groups and even governments and state institutions can be held accountable for, instead of simply a subjective discourse about motivations where “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”.
How can ID cards combat terrorism then? Well that is the crux of the problem. In terms of stopping unexpected acts of violence (like a bombing of a petrol station), ID cards will have a limited utility and indeed the government hasn’t suggested that their introduction would be able to stop such ‘random’ acts of terror completely, simply because they ARE unexpected and apparently random.
What ID cards can help to do is to first weed out the varios radicals and militant demagogues who do not have legal residency within the UK. It is harder to hide within the faceless masses of British citizenry if all people are required to identify who they are, what their nationality-status is and where they live. Harder, but admittedly not impossible.
So there is an element of ‘keeping tabs’ on certain people, which could indeed lead to abuse if the insufficient check and balances are not put into place.
Turkey requires that all its citizens carry ID with them at all times and yet this had not stopped terrorist attacks within that country, as critics of the British ID scheme have pointed out. However, it is reasonable to suggest that as the system suggested by the British government is far more ambitious and technologically advanced than anything that exists outside of the UK and indeed as Britain as a country has a well established and very organised (some might say regimented) state infrastructure, it is possible that the British experience of ID cards and combating terrorism might be different from the Turkish one.
Besides anything else, Britain is much smaller than Turkey and has less places to hide – not that it is impossible for would-be terrorists to hide in the UK, rather that it would be hard for secret militias to train and mobilise within the UK than it is for them to do in such a large country as Turkey with so many areas of wilderness.
So the current absence of a definite correlation between ID cards and an increased utility in the fight against terrorism may yet prove to be circumstantial to the type of ID card and state in question rather than implicit to ID cards in themselves. Time will undoubtedly tell.